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DEBONO vs SALVINO BUGEJA NOE ET 1 
AN EXERCISE IN JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
ALFRED GREOI 
FOLLOWING the decision of the Civil Court 1st Hall in 'Debono vs 
Salvino Bugeja noe et' those who are not prepared to accept the 
tunnel vision of the 1st Hall must be at pains to grope for a better 
appreciation of the problem of controlling administrative action in 
Malta. 
The Housing Secretary had issued a requisition order on a parti-
cular tenement which was duly served on Debono on che 26th March 
1974. Debona had taken the tenement on lease, on the 11th March 
1974 and went to live in it with his family on the 12th March. On 
eviction, the plaintiff retired to his private van as a protest and 
immediately instituted action against the Housing Secretary. He 
alleged that he was unlawfully evicted from his dwelling and that 
the alternative accomodation offered by the Housing Department 
was too small to live in. 
As a preliminary objection, the Court had to decide, whether the 
ocher defendant, the then Parliamentary Secretary responsible for 
Housing, had a 'locus standi indicii' in the case. The court decid-
ed in the negative '(billi) tilliberah mill-harsien tal-gudizzju'. 
On the merits, plaintiff asked the Court to annul! the requisition 
order due to substantial irregularity, a process which involved the 
examination of the merits of the administrative act and decide 
whether extraneous considerations had been taken into account by 
the issuing authority, making that act incorrect according to the 
enabling powers - in short che court had to exercise. judicial re-
view. 
Materially this was what plaintiff asked. But the wording of the 
claim was rather confusing. In the first place, it was submitted 
that the Housing Secretary had not observed the rules of natural 
justice. The meaning of 'natural justice' in this context is not clear. 
Because if plaintiff referred to the non-observance of the rules of 
natural justice as a testof control upon the administrative act, the 
phrasing is rather unhappy, if not improper. Natural Justice fea-
tures as a test for control in Judicial or quasi-judicial 2 functions 
1 1st Hall - 14th August, 197 4. 
2 Vide comments on the distinction between Judicial and Quasi-Judicial. 
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of administrative bodies, where the elements of adjudication as 
laid down in the Report of the Committee on Ministers' powers 3 
can be detected. In the present case, the Administrative action in 
issue is purely 'administrative', 4 and the Housing Secretary is no· 
where required by law to adjudicate upon the facts in exercising 
his discretion. 
Again, reference to the action being 'ultra vires' can lead to, 
perhaps, unfortunate conclusions, because this is a term normally 
used in that part of Administrative Law dealing with delegated le-
gislation. But if 'ultra vices' is to be broadly interpreted then it 
could mean any exercise of power beyond authorisation. In that 
case the action of the Housing Secretary may be impugned either 
because it is an action which the law does not empower, or be-
cause it has been done for a purpose which the law does not con-
template. One is formal the other is substantial. 
Be that as it may, plaintiff challenged the reasonableness of the 
requisition order having regard to the provisions of section 4 of 
the Housing Act, that the requisition order is to be issued by the 
Housing Secretary 'in the public interest or for providing living ac-
comodation to persons or for ensuring a fair distribution of living 
accomodation'. When reasonableness is the question the adjudi-
cating authority has to go behind the facts and incidents which de-
termined a particular decision or action, and decide whether the 
conclusions reached compare with the given standards. The text of 
the law is not very helpful in this, because it is clearly evident 
that the vague diction is intended to confer the widest possible 
power (a blank cheque) on the administrative authority in exercis-
ing its discretion. But there is at least the 'public interest' quali-
fication of section 4 and any requisition order may be reviewed ac-
cordingly, however vague and ambiguous the meaning of the term. 
The Court was not even prepared to go as far as that however. 
The decision of Mr.Justice Xerri was plain and categroic. Section 
4 of the Housing Act empowers the Housing Secretary, 'if it ap-
pears to him to be necessary or expedient in the public interest, or 
for providing living accomodation to persons or for ensuring a fair 
distribution of · living accomodation', to requisition 'any building' 
3 Committee on Minister's Powers Report 1932 p. 71 et seq • . 
4 Vide the Housing Act 1949, which does not require any save procedure 
save that the Housing Secretary 'may in his absolute discretion' and 'in 
the public interest' issue a requisition order. 
and 'may give such directions as appear to him to be necessary or 
expedient in order that the requisition may be put into effect or 
complied with'. This absolute discretion vested in the Housing 
Secretary in 1949 was never since restricted neither by law nor by 
the Courts of Law. Nor was there any variation in interpretation by 
the Court. So all the Court can do is, to ascertain that the form 
prescribed by law has been followed, and that the official issuing 
it was vested with the proper authority. The discretion of the 
Housing Secretary is not subject to review by the Courts. The 
Court was satisfied that in the present case the Housing Secretary 
acted according to law with the formalities prescribed and there-
fore plaintiff's claim could not be accepted. 
This decision is typical of the attitude the Maltese Courts have 
taken towards the exercise of Administrative discretion , The line 
of judgements upholding the unrestricted exercise of administrative 
action dates back to the decision given by the First Hall of the 
Civil Court in ' Demarco vs Turner' 5 where it was held that: 
'ove gli attori avessero fatto domanda per la revocazione 
dell'atto compiuto dal Direttore dei servigi veterinari per non 
essersi costui mantenuto nell'orbita delle sue attribuzioni non 
abbia ecceduto i limiti posti dalla legge, questa autorita giu-
diziaria avrebbe potuto esaminare la legalita. del provvedimen-
to emanato da quell'ufficiale pubblico, e la questione insor-
gente da tale domanda, e negare qualsiasi effetto giuridico 
all'atto compiuto, senza averne la facolta di complierlo, o in 
eccesso di tale facolca, o senza aver 6sservato le forme e le 
procedure all'uopo necessarie; ma essi attori pongono come 
base delle altre loro domande quella per la revoca del giudizio 
emesso da quell'ufficiale, e questa quistione sfugge al pote-
re, giudizionale di questo tribunale Civile, il quale non puo 
censurare i criteri che hanno ispirato detto Direttore, nel fare 
quella dichiarazione, senza che es so Tribunale venga ad inva-
dere il cam po che non e suo., 6 
So long as the statutory requirements for validity of form and 
procedure are observed, the Courts would not interfere with the 
exercise of Administrative Action, even where the Administrator 
has erred in law or in fact. Justification for this line of defence 
5 Vol. XXVIII-ll-455. 
6 lbid at p. 458. 
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was sought in the outmoded concept of Sovereign immunity and in-
fallibility, 7 together with the complementary conception of execu-
tive action in terms of power and 'imperium'. 8 It found a solid foun-
dation in the doctrine of double personality which placed the admi-
nistration beyond the control of the Courts when acting 'iure im-
perii '. Practical considerations must have played their pan as we 11. 
Examining the substance of a purely Administrative Act may in· 
volve the Courts in a perilous adventure to the depths of political 
argument. And the courts may indeed be unprepared to wet their 
finger tips. 
Also, the administrative official may not have given a reasoned 
answer in the exercise of his discretion. It might be impossible to 
overrule his action from the attending conside'rations. This was 
the problem which the British Judges had to face in developing an 
effective theory of judicial review. On the one hand they had to 
tread cautiously not to limit the powers conferred by Parliament, 
however wide and absolute, if they were to be exercised in the na-
tional interest, while on the other 'Judicial self-preservation may 
(have) alone dictate( d) restraint'. 9 
The issue may be tinged by the doctrine of Ministerial Respon-
sibility to Parliament on questions of policy. But it must be rea· 
lized that Parliament does not have the material opportunity to 
discuss, let alone control the sporadic actions of the various of-
ficers down the administrative echelons. Nor can Parliament re-
verse decisions or grant remedies to injured individuals. The ul-
timate control remains with the Judiciary. 
In England the implications of the unrestricted increase in ad-
ministrative powers were fully realised when Parliament and the 
Executive started to make improper encroachments on the territor-
ial preserves of the Courts. 'Lyanage vs R.' ( 1967) was the occa-
sion for Parliament to attempt a reversal of a decision given by 
the House of Lords with retroactive effect. It was argued that if 
the Judges ought not to set themselves up as politicians, the poli-
ticians ought not to set themselves up as Judges. 'The Government 
manifests its non-partizan approach to a matter of public concern, 
the judges manifest their sense of obligation towards the Welfare 
7 The Doctrine that the Crown can do no wrong. 
8 Vide Gulia 'Governmental Liability'. 
9 Per Parker C.J •. 'Recent Developments in the Supervisory Powers of the 
Courts and inferior tribunals' 
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of the State'. 10 Over the past ten years there has been a growing 
tendency to invoke judicial review, .and the courts have been found 
ready to intervene. They are growing more and more aware of the 
dangers inherent in absolute power. 
The Maltese courts do not seem to be influenced by this move-
ment or similar trends on the Continent where the individual may 
seek redress against the executive in special Administrative 
Courts. They have been lost in the wilderness of a judicial laby-
rinth, by the inconsistent, · and by now rejected doctrine of the 
double personality of the state. 11 And in one judgement at least 
the notion of 'ius imperii' was even extended to the legislative 
Acts of parliament, 12 an absurd conclusion which even a bare 
knowledge of Constitutional interpretation can put to scorn. 13 'De-
b6no vs Salvino Bugeja noe et' is typical of the restrictive view 
nothing of which kind is found ranging in the Administrative Courts 
of the Continent and the ordinary Courts of England. The judicial 
milestone in 'Sciberras vs The Housing Secretary et' 14 was indif-
ferently discarded and Mr. Justice Xerri decided the case on the 
strict interpretation of the law. So long as the requisition order 
was issued according to the formalities and by the authoriry pre-
scribed by law, the object of the Court was exhausted. A cursory 
orientation in the practice of judicial review would clearly mark 
out the difficulties of this conclusion. It is difficult to control ad-
ministrative action merely by form and authority. It must be con-
ceded that power may be legally vested in an authority and its ex-
ercise be unlawful. A right may be abused though not infringed. 
This was Plaintiff's contention in the case, and the Court was 
asked to decide on the basis of 'Sciberras vs Housing Secretary 
noe et'. 
The doctrine of the double personality of the State for long in 
disfavour with the more advanced legal opinion was thrown over-
board by the Court of Appeal in 'John Lowell et vs Onor. Dr. Car-
melo Caruana et'. 15 It was the pillar on which the long line of de-
10 oe Smith 'Judicial Control of Administrative Action', 3rd ed. P• 30. 
11 Lowell vs Caruana C.A. 14th August, 1972. 
12 Vide 'Neg • .John Coleiro ne vs. Onor. Dr. Giorgio Borg Olivier'. Vol. 
XLI-II-1045. 
13 Vide now 'Buctigieg vs Borg Olivier'. Vol.XLVII-I-1 
14 Per Sammut J. First Hall 21st July, 1974. 
15 C. A. 14th August, 1972. 
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c1s1ons upholding the immunity of Execuci ve action had rested. 
Once the deep seated foundations for that attitude had been des· 
troyed the Court was able to lay down the principle that where the 
exercise of administrative acts is in question, the principles of 
English Law on this point are to be adopted. This is in conformity 
with 'Cassar Desain vs Forbes' 16 and subsequent decisions. 
Three principles from English Public Law were enumerated. 
(a) The Court may interfere where the exercise of discretion was 
not according to t~e conditions provided by Statute, or, in other 
words had violated the basis of the power granted by statute - ex· 
cess of power; 
(b) The exercise of administrative discretion may be controlled 
where the power has been exercised for a purpose for which it was 
not conformed. That is to say, when it is used for any other purpose 
or on considerations extraneous to the legislation which conferred 
the power - abuse of power. 
(c) An authority entrusted with a discretion must not in the pur· 
ported exercise of its discretion act under the dictation of another 
body or person. 17 An authority who is vested with a discretion can· 
not act according to the directions or instructions of his depart· 
mental superior, without exercising his independent judgement. 
Any action or order so made would be in valid. 18 
The Housing Secretary was thus acting illegally when he was di· 
rected by the Ministers . - a case of failure to exercise a discre· 
tion, 19 and when it appeared from the circumstances of the case 
that the requisition order was issued to circumvent a judgement by 
the Rent Regulation Board ordering eviction - a case of improper 
purpose. The Court took the plunge and ordered the restitution of 
the requisitioned building to requisitionee. That was enough for a 
first step. Subsequent cases could go on to develop more fully the 
inner matrix of the doctrine of judicial review and provide the in· 
di vi dual ·with a long needed remedy against the unscrupulous in· 
trusion by beurocratic functions on the checked domain of individ· 
ual rights. 
'Debono vs Housing Secretary' did not follow these steps, and 
16 Vol. XXXIV·l·43. 
17 De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd Edn. p. 273. 
18 Basu: Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. I, p. 318. 
19 Vi de De Smith op. cit. p. 263 et seq. 
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rejected all that had laboriously been said. It was a case of sheer 
backsliding, unmasking an impending fear to move forward with the 
spirit of the changing times. But the conservative mentality in ju-
dicial circles cannot be upheld to the point of legal sophism and 
legalised injustice. Judicial lethargy to the immediate problems 
which arouse public concern cannot be glossed over so easily, 
simply because the common public is unable to follow the subtit-
les of legal argument. · 
This is part of the function of the Courts, as guardians of law, 
to safeguard the rule of law, not necessarily manifest in positive 
legislation. They should be keen sentinels, prompt to mark the 
first shoot of social injustice which reai's its head on any possible 
occasion in a democratic society hypnotised by the ideals of libe-
ralism: 
'Jekk il-Qorti bhal f'pajjii:i demokratid obra, jipprovaw jaqdu 
1-funzjoni mportanti u xejn fadi ta' review assenjata lilhom 
dana mhux dovut glial xi vellejita jew xi xewqa li tigi kkricika-
ta 1-Amministrazzjoni jew il-legislatura, ii:da huwa dovut biss 
glian-necessica tad-disimpenn ta' dmir espressament impost 
fuqha mill-istess koscituzzjoni. Dan hu partikularment il-kaz 
rigward id-drittijiet u 1-libertajiet li dwarhom il-Qorti giet 
Kostitwica bbala sentinella cal-qui vive .. .' 20 
The matter did not stop there. The decision was appealed from. 
Before the Court of Appeal, Defence Counsel sought to unearth 
the penetrating ramifications of judicial practice in England where 
an administrative action is being contested. The crucial issue was 
where to draw the line between individual and public interest, and 
how far are the courts expected to interfere in the exerdise of dis-
cretion to protect the former. But more important was the reference 
to the rule of law, and the principle that when the rights of the 
private citizen have been infringed the Courts should grant a reme-
dy. The reasons for granting a remedy seemed (according to the 
opinion of the present writer) to outweigh the excuses for admi-
nistrative immunity. It could be said that this was a case where 
the deeds themselves spoke loud and clear. But the Court of Ap-
peal did not pronounce itself, because that would have involved an 
20 Buttigieg v. Borg Olivier. C. of Appeal 10th January, 1964. But the re-
ference 'review' in this quotation refers to the Judicial Review of Legis-
lative action under the Constitution. 
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adventurous expedition to those unsafe regions of terra incognita 
(it was alleged). It could neither refuse to deliver judgment and 
deny justice. Tactfully it suggested a Compromise. 
It was reported afterwards that plaintiff was given a lease hold 
by the Housing Department instead of the requisitioned building 
and appeal was abandoned. The dictates of justice were hardly 
satisfied in this case. But what is more disquieting is the com· 
plete failure of the courts to develop a sound system of judicial 
review which is by now, long overdue. 
THE ME A NI NG OF THE 1971 
PARIS. CONVENTIONS ON COPYRIGHT* 
J. A. MICALLEF 
MANY complex problems in the field of International Copyright 
arise because the matter is governed by two different conventions. 
While most of the European States continued to adhere to the Inter-
national C.Onvencions signed in Berne in · the 19th Century, the 
United Nations had signed soon after World War II another interna-
tional instrument known as the Universal Copyright Convention. 
An attempt has now been made in Paris to bring into closer associ· 
ation these two international agreements and setting up of an in· 
temational centre as a link between publishing houses and the 
developing countries. 
It was no doubt a unique occasion to observe delegates. from so 
many different countries attending simultaneously two intemational 
conventions, and make it dear that they had come to U.N.E.S.C.O. 
House at Place de Fentenoy, Paris, with the spirit and zeal to re-
vise two conventions simultaneously, albeit in separate gatherings, 
and to create greater harmony and co-operation between them. 
*The Original copy of this Article was sent to Dr.Arpad Bogsch, Deputy 
Director of the World Intellectual Property Organization who deposited it 
at the Library of W.I.P.O. at Geneva. A Memo-Study was sent to the Mal• 
tese Ministry of Trade and Industry after the Paris Conferences and the 
matter was the subject of a Public Lecture given under the auspices of 
the Law Society at the Aula Magna, on April 25, 1972. 
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